University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

1976

The Child Support Enforcement Process Study
David L. Chambers

University of Michigan School of Law, dcham@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters/394

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters
Part of the Family Law Commons

Publication Information & Recommended Citation
Chambers, David L. "The Child Support Enforcement Process Study." In Cases and Materials on Family
Law, edited by C. Foote et al., 850-6. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1976.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Book Chapters by an authorized
administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

850

6. Support and Property

CHAMBERS, THE CHILD-SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROCESS STUDY 125

Do divorced fathers under orders of child support pay? We have found a
large county in Michigan where most fathers pay most of the time.
Each Michigan county contains an unusual agency that oversees nearly
all matters relating to divorce. Known as the Friend of the Court, the agency
advises the circuit judges on child custody and the appropriate amount of
support orders in all divorce cases in which there are children. Throughout
the life of the decree, it receives all payments from the support-paying
parent and remits them to the other parent, the guardian, or, in welfare
cases, the Department of Social Services. And it functions as police and
125. A study on child support enforcement conducted by Prof. David Chambers of the
University of Michigan School of Law with the aid of Terry K. Adams and Ray M.
Shortridge. It is expected that the study will be published in 1976. The material repro
duced here represents a preliminary summary of the principal findings with respect to
one Michigan county (Genesee) in which the study was conducted.
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prosecutor over the entire enforcement process in both welfare and nonwelfare cases.
We have conducted a study drawing on the files of the Friend of the
Court in two Michigan counties and plan a more abbreviated inquiry into
several more. To date only the information from one of the counties, Genesee
County, has been analyzed even preliminarily and the results reported here
are subject to further verification. Genesee County has nearly a half-million
residents. Flint, its principal city, is an automobile town. Thus, a high portion of the residents of the county as a whole and of the fathers under orders
of support are blue-collar factory workers. Despite the prosperity that the
automobile industry has generally brought the county, the county's unemployment rate has remained higher than that in the nation as a whole
even in the most prosperous years.
Examining the agency case files of 411 randomly selected divorced men
for whom support orders were alive during 1969 or 1970, we have found that
the average weekly child-support order was $35 or about one-third of the
father's take-home pay at the point of divorce. We have further found that
over an average order-life of seven years ( up to the summer of 1973 when
we examined the files), the average amount paid by fathers in all cases was
approximately 77 percent of everything ordered. The median amount paid
was 89 percent. That is to say, half of all fathers had paid 89 percent or more
of everything ordered over the life of the decree. Only about 11 percent of
the fathers had paid 30 percent or less of the total ordered amount.
When we try to identify what sorts of fathers pay more reliably than
others, what appears most strikingly is how nearly equally most identifiable
subgroups within the population perform. Blue-collar fathers inside and
outside the auto industry, black fathers and white fathers, fathers with few
children and fathers with many, fathers divorced after a short marriage and
those divorced after a long marriage all have mean performance rates of at
least two-thirds of everything ordered. ( Making two-thirds of payments due
will seem high or low depending on expectations. From the mother's side,
receiving only two-thirds of the amounts due will aggravate the financial
problems she is already probably experiencing.) The only identifiable subgroup containing 30 or more men with a mean payment performance of less
than 50 percent of everything ordered is the group of 36 men with an indication in the files of an arrest or conviction for offenses other than nonsupport.
With a caution about premature conclusions about causal connections, let
us describe another notable characteristic of the Friend of the Court in
Genesee County: it enforces the court orders of support with considerable
ardor. It employs a full-time staff of enforcement officers who write warning
letters, seek warrants of arrest, and, armed with revolvers, pursue fathers to
their places of employment or to their homes or favorite bars. The staff's
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efforts appear as substantial in cases in which the former wife is not receiving welfare benefits as it does in cases in which she is.
We have found that the median number of enforcement efforts was four
for all cases in the random sample. The bulk of these efforts were warning
letters, but two techniques other than the letters merit special mention. The
first of these is the wage assignment, a court order directing an employer to
deduct the support amount each week from the father's paycheck and forward the amount to the Friend of the Court. In over 40 percent of all our
cases at least one wage assignment was entered, frequently on a voluntary
basis, during the life of the decree and we have found that the entry of a
wage assignment was generally followed by a substantial period of steady
payments.
The second noteworthy form of enforcement effort is jailing. Over onefifth of fathers are brought before a judge at some point for failing to pay,
generally after spending a few hours or a few days in jail. One out of every
seven men in the sample ( 64 of 411) were sentenced at least once for contempt of court for their failure to pay under the court order. ( Let us put this
finding another way for emphasis: assuming, as we believe, that the files in
our sample are representative of the agency's behavior over time, one out of
every seven men with children who are divorced in Genesee County end up
in jail at least once under sentence for contempt.) These sentences were not
for slight periods. By special statute, the judges were empowered to sentence
men to up to a year in jail, subject to the man's earlier release upon payment
of the whole arrearage or some lesser part of it satisfactory to the judge, or
upon arriving at some other arrangement approved by the judge, such as a
wage assignment. In a representative subsample we ran of 191 men jailed
during 1969 and the first nine months of 1970 ( approximately 70 percent of
the persons jailed during the period), we found over 80 percent of the
sentences imposed were for six months or more and that the average length
of time actually served was 99 days. One-third of the men served five full
months or more.
What effect did jail exert on the payment performance of the men jailed?
Half of the men at some point made a lump payment to purge themselves
of contempt and purchase their release. The median size of these payments
was $500. In addition, nearly 40 percent of the jailed fa_thers began within
two months after release from jail a period of regular payments lasting at
least 10 weeks. On the other hand, on only a few of the men who did begin
paying after jail had the judges previously tried any less drastic enforcement
technique, such as suspended sentence or probation. Moreover, one-third of
all the fathers jailed apparently left the county within a year of release and
made few if any payments after release. Another substantial group within
the jailed group - unemployed blue-collar persons with identified alcohol
problems - generally did not leave town but still paid very little either for
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release or in week-by-week payments thereafter and were often jailed several times over the life of their support order. The judges are permitted by the
authorizing statute to jail only upon a finding that the nonpaying father had
been capable of paying. Usually, however, the court seemed to assume that
any man not obviously crippled had been capable of paying.
What effect does the prospect of jailing have on the payment performance
of the eighty-five percent of Flint's fathers who are never sentenced there?
We can say little with confidence by looking at Flint's data alone. One
simply cannot assess the influence of a factor such as jailing on behavior
such as child support payment by a study of one locality. The payment performance of the general population, even if extremely high, could be the
result of any number of factors relating to desire and capacity to pay and
have nothing to do with the extent to which authorities rely on jailing.
Comparisons with other places are thus essential. Until we complete our
analysis of other Michigan counties, all that is available to us, for its suggestive value alone, is Kenneth Eckhardt's study of child support collections
in Dane County, Wisconsin. ( Eckhardt, Social Change, Legal Controls, and
Child Support, University of Wisconsin 1965.) 126 Even a superficial comparison reveals startling differences in performance between the two places.
In 1965, Eckhardt completed an examination of child support collection
for 163 men divorced in a single year in Dane County, Wisconsin, whose
payment records he followed over a 10-year period. In Table [6-8], we compare the payment performance record he found in his cases through time
with the payment performance of our random sample in Genesee County.
The contrast between the two counties is obvious and striking. In Genesee
County, collections get better through time. Though the portion of men in
the no-payments column increased slightly between the first and seventh
years, a far higher portion of the men moved over this period into the fullpayments column. In the 7th year after the divorce 54 percent of the men
paid everything ordered under the decree. In Dane County, Wisconsin, collections become steadily worse through time, with all the movement ( in net
change) out of the full and partial payments column and into the no-payment column. In the 7th year, only 17 percent of fathers make full payments.
Stated another way in figures not available from the table, in Dane County,
the mean portion collected for all cases through the seventh year is no
higher than 30 percent of everything ordered. In Genesee, by contrast, the
mean portion paid of everything ordered over the seven years is nearly 80
percent.
Eckhardt also found a dramatic drop in payments immediately after the
remarriage of either the father or the mother, suggesting to him that those
events stood as strong psychological barriers to payment or, in the case of
126. For a summary of the Eckhardt study, see Eckhardt, Deviance, Visibility and
Legal Action: The Duty to Support, 15 Soc. Probs. 470 ( 1968). - Ed.
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Dane County, Wisconsin*
Fathers Making
Year of
Obligation
First
Third
Fifth
Seventh

No Payments
Percent

Partial Paym 'ts
Percent

Full Paym 'ts
Percent

Total

N=

42
59
67

20
15
14
12

38
26
19
17

100%
100
100
100

163
161
160
157

Partial Paym 'ts
Percent

Full Paym 'ts
Percent

Total

N=

46
35
32
26

39
48
51
54

100%
100
100
100

342
382
287
204

71

Genesee County, Michigant
Fathers Making
Year of
Obligation
First
Third
Fifth
Seventh

No Payments
Percent
15
17
17
20

* From Eckhardt, K. W., Social Change, Legal Controls, and Child Support: A Study
in the Sociology of Law (1965), at page 226.
t In this table, we have made an adjustment for a small group of low-paying cases
opened prior to 1966 when the Friend of the Court puts its payment records on computer. By examining all orders set by the courts in 1960 and 1963, we have determined
that about 7 percent of cases opened in those years had been closed by 1966 for consistent nonpayment without request for enforcement. In the adjustments we have made,
we have increased the total cases to reflect an additional number of cases presumably
closed and placed all such assumed closed cases in the "no payments" column. The effect is slight. For the four years reprinted here, the actual number of files prior to the
adjustment was 10 fewer than reported above in the "First Year" (332 rather than 342)
and 11 fewer in each of the "Third," "Fifth," and "Seventh" years.
For Genesee County, we have counted as cases making no payments, ones paying 10%
or less of whatever is due and as cases-mald.ng-full payments, ones paying 90% or more of
everything owed. Since Eckhardt recalls the partial paying cases in his sample as being
generally low performers, our definition of no payments and full payments almost certainly flattens rather than exaggerates the differences between Genesee and Dane.
Table 6-8. Distribution of Child Support Payments Year-by-Year By Divorced Fathers
Over Seven-Year Period After Divorce

the man's remarriage, perhaps as a real financial barrier to continued payment. In Genesee County, by contrast, we have found no such drop upon the
remarriage of either spouse, suggesting either that remarriage has much
different psychological content in the two places, which seems unlikely, or
that some other force in Genesee County prevents the men there from giving
expression to a lessened desire to pay upon either's remarriage.
The differences observed between the Wisconsin county and the Michigan
county evidently do not stem from differences in the sampling frame.
Neither study failed to include non-paying cases in their sample. The cases
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examined in each representatively sample the entire spectrum of payment
performance - fr9m no-payment cases to steady payment cases.
We doubt that much of the difference between the two places can be
explained in terms of differences in the socio-economic composition of the
population in the two counties. As to overall collections, both counties were
generally prosperous and such differences as there are might suggest that the
Wisconsin group would. have paid more, not less, than the Genesee group.
( Specifically, Eckhardt and we have both found that white-collar persons
perform slightly better than blue-collar, but the portion of white collar persons was substantially lower in Genesee County than it was in Dane County,
which includes Madison, a university town and the state capital.) Moreover,
as to the differing payment record upon remarriage and the contrasting
directions in rates of payments in the entire caseload through time, it is
difficult even to hypothesize plausible differences in socio-economic characteristics that would provide an explanation.
Unless there was something peculiar about the men divorced during the
year that Eckhardt picked as his sample base, the most sensible explanation
for the differences between Madison and Genesee which we can develop
from Eckhardt's description lies in differences in the enforcement process.
The differences are complex. In each place the level of jailing was high - at
least as high a portion of Dane's caseload was jailed as was jailed in Genesee
- but in Dane jailing was visited almost solely on persons with other criminal records. The balance of the caseload enjoyed a substantial immunity not
only from jailing but also to a large extent from any official reminders of
their obligations to pay. 127 Both the selection of persons with other criminal
records and the haphazardness of the rest of the process can be explained
in large part by the fact that in Dane the only public agency charged with
enforcement of support orders was the prosecutor, who had responsibility
for enforcing the whole range of criminal laws. In Genesee, by contrast,
support enforcement is the responsibility of a specialized agency, and jail
appears the capstone of a well-organized barrage of letters, cajolery, wage
assignments and so forth.
What we are left with after looking at these two counties is the strong
suspicion that the enforcement process has a good deal to do with the differences in collections. The problem is that, even if we are correct in our
suspicion, we cannot determine what particular differences in the enforce127. Eckhardt found that, aside from prior criminal record, the principal factors associated with greater enforcement efforts in Wisconsin were social class and need for public
assistance. Thus although 90 percent of the white collar and 80 percent of the blue collar
support obligors were in default at one point in the course of the ten years that the study
encompassed, only 21 percent of the white collar defendants experienced court action,
as contrasted with 44 percent of the blue collar defendants. Similarly 89 percent of the
fathers whose families had applied for welfare had contempt actions filed, as compared
with 24 percent of the nonwelfare fathers. - Ed.

856

6. Support and Property

ment systems explains the difference in collections. Does jailing make an
important difference in overall collections, when it, as in Genesee County,
is the boom that an agency constantly threatens to lower on nearly everyone
who falls into arrears? Or is jailing largely irrelevant and the more significant
or only significant difference between the two places is the fact of a full-time
agency serving constantly to remind men of their obligations?
We hope that our information from Washtenaw County, Michigan, will
help us test to some degree the relative credibility of these competing explanations. In Washtenaw County (unlike Dane or Genesee), the level of
jailing was very low but ( like Genesee but unlike Dane) there is a specialized enforcement agency and the level of reliance on techniques short of jail
seems to have been high. We further hope, of course, that our study of
aggregate information on collections and enforcement efforts in twenty other
Michigan counties will help us isolate the comparative impact of different
techniques.

NOTE

1. The high incidence of failure to make support payments indicated by
the Goode and Eckhardt studies is also reflected in other available data.
A 1955 study of families receiving AFDC benefits, though obviously not
representative of the population as a whole, 128 revealed that child support
payments averaging $67 .63 per month had been ordered or agreed to ·in 42
percent of the 162,440 families where the now absent father had once been
on the scene, married to the mother of the child. Kaplan, Support from
Absent Fathers of Children Receiving ADC 1955, pp. 7, 15 ( U.S. Bureau of
Public Assistance Rep. No. 41, 1960). But in only about half of these cases
( and only 18.3 percent of the total cases) was any support actually received
from the father. Id. at 24-25.
The study also covered 125,220 families on AFDC where the father was
never married to the mother of the children. Although analogous in many
ways to the subject of child support after divorce, enforcement of support
of illegitimate children may include significant additional issues, such as
proof of paternity. See page 645 supra. In only 10.2 percent of the cases involving unwed fathers were the mothers receiving contributions from them,
128. In most middle or upper class divorces the property rights of the parties are
determined by agreement. See Chapter 7. In the 3306 actions for divorce, annulment, or
alimony filed in Maryland in 1929 and disposed of by 1931, Marshall and May estimated
that at least a quarter were settled by agreement ( 198 agreements filed with courts;
estimated that at least 600 more existed but were not filed). 1 Marshall & May, note 114
supra, at 220-221. See also Hopson, note 119 supra, at 118 ( agreements in seventeen out
of forty cases).
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and almost all were less than $50 per month. Court orders requiring support
were outstanding in 10.4 percent of the cases, and in an additional 7.3 percent the father had entered into an agreement to provide support. Id. at
5-6, 38-39.
A more recent study of 236,911 California AFDC cases, in which eligibility
was based on continued absence of a parent, revealed that during the fourth
quarter of fiscal 1970 child support payments were received in only 17.6 percent of the cases. Calif. Dept. Soc. Welfare, Final Report of the Task Force
on Absent Parental Child Support, App. 5 ( 1971).
This situation appears to be closely paralleled by the experience in other
countries. An Australian study of 254 deserted mothers found that "only
thirty-six ( 14.3%) mothers were receiving regularly maintenance from their
husbands, and another fifty-five ( 21.8%) were receiving it so irregularly that
they could not rely on it when budgeting their expenses. Ninety-six ( 38.1%)
had never received any maintenance payment, although there had been an
order drawn in this respect; and the remaining sixty-five ( 25.8%) did not
even have maintenance orders drawn against their husbands. . . .'' 129 In
Germany, a questionnaire circulated by Parents Without Partners revealed
that the comparable figures there were: 37% paid regularly, 43% paid irregularly in time or amount or only began payments after some years had
elapsed, and 20% never paid at all. 130 A subsequent inquiry by an official of
the Hamburg Youth Office corroborated these data - 53.2% of the fathers
either did not pay at all, or only did so after being summoned into court and
required to post a bond.
2. Despite this acknowledged problem of widespread nonpayment, as the
data shows, legal remedies are seldom invoked, and are often ineffective
when they are used. In addition to the cumbersomeness of the enforcement
mechanics ( see pages 860-877 infra), among the other reasons are the
mother's lack of interest suggested by Goode, and the pride, guilt, and desire
to expunge the past found in some mothers by the German survey.
Another factor may be the inability to locate the father. The Kaplan study
of AFDC families found that this was one of the principal reasons for the
ineffectiveness of the private support remedies. In 54.5 percent of the cases
the whereabouts of the father were unknown. 131 Because the father's payments, if any, generally serve to reduce public assistance disbursements, the
Social Security Act requires that law enforcement officials be notified of
129. Krupinsky et al., The Deserted Mother in Victoria ( 1970), quoted in Hambly &
Turner, Cases & Materials on Australian Family Law 411 ( 1971).
130. "Only Every Third Man Pays," Die Zeit, Jan. 2, 1973.
131. Kaplan, page 856 supra, at 6. Even where his whereabouts was known and the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act was utilizable, in only about 40 percent
of the cases was the Act invoked, and in only one-third of these was support actually
ordered. Id. at 65 (Table A-27).
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deserting fathers whose families are rece1vmg AFDC payments. 132 Until
recently, the federal government, though providing to state or local welfare
agencies any information it had acquired concerning the father's whereabouts, was unwilling to make such information available generally to
private individuals seeking to enforce support obligations. Overriding the
views of HEW as well as others concerned about potential abuses that might
result from the indiscriminate dissemination of such information, Congress
recently amended the Social Security Act to bring to bear the full weight of
the federal machinery ( including the Social Security system and the IRS )
in the attempt to locate and collect from absent support obligors. Although
the law is aimed primarily at fathers whose families are on welfare - it requires the mother, as a condition of receiving assistance, to assign her support rights to the state and to cooperate in ferreting out the father 133 - the
locator services are made available also to nonwelfare individuals. Welfare
recipients are induced to take advantage of the new statute not only by the
stick ( e.g., the coercive provisions ref erred to above) but also by the carrot
( a right to keep 40% of each $50 monthly payment obtained from the obligor
without reducing the welfare grant). See Pub. Law 93-647 ( 1975) . 134
Another bar to effective enforcement of support orders may be that many
fathers just do not have the financial resources to make the payments, particularly where they have taken on responsibility for a new family. As Goode
reports, a major factor in continuity of payments is continuity of employment. A Massachusetts study of prosecutions for criminal nonsupport showed
that the highest nonsupport rates occurred in those counties with the
highest unemployment and poverty rates. 135 But compare the data from
Genesee County in Michigan, which seems to suggest that employment
stability may not be an ultimate determining factor of compliance.
Whatever the causes, it appears that even where the husband has been
132. Id. at 12. This is the so-called NOLEO ( Notice to Law Enforcement Officers)
provision. The required notice had been given in 46.6 percent of the cases involving
unwed fathers, but the whereabouts of the father remained unknown in 61.2 percent of
the cases.
133. Earlier cases had held that such a state-imposed eligibility requirement was a
violation of the Social Security Act. See, e.g., Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 ( D. Conn.
1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 488 ( 1970). Are there valid constitutional objections
that can be raised against the new provision?
134. A number of states have also enacted measures to facilitate location of absent
fathers, such as making motor vehicle registration and other files available to specified
agencies in their own government and in some instances to agencies of other states. See,
e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. §83-161 ( Supp. 1973). At least one state has established a central
registry for location of deserting parents. N .Y. Social Services Law §372-a ( Supp. 1973).
Sometimes the authority is limited to public assistance cases. Private individuals generally have no access to these data. See Council of State Governments, Reciprocal State
Legislation to Enforce the Support of Dependents ( revised annually) for a state-by-state
listing of location services.
135. Mass. Advisory Council on Home and Family, Family Support Laws, An Inquiry
Into Enforcement of Non-Support 8-9 ( 1972).
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located and action taken against him, the efforts are often fruitless, as indicated by the numerous multiple contempt citation cases discussed by Eckhardt. The Massachusetts study concluded that "more vigorous enforcement,
in terms of heavy penalties, has no more tendency to reduce the non-support
rate than the least vigorous." 136 In light of the Michigan study, is this a safe
conclusion? To the extent that money saving is the goal of the intensified
enforcement efforts, it must also be kept in mind that the costs of enforcement may be greater than the sums collected, and where public support has
been resorted to, the contributions may do little to diminish the overall
public expense. 137
Some commentators, however, paint a different picture. They assert that
many defaulting husbands are not indigent and could well afford to make
the required payments. 138 In point of fact, it is claimed they would do so if
judges, lawyers, and law enforcement officials demonstrated that they were
serious about enforcing these obligations. 139 This apathy on the part of those
charged with enforcement is attributed either to a lack of consciousness of
the needs of children for food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and other
basics, 140 or to a pro-male bias 141 that precludes taking action against exhusbands.
It should be noted that the validity of this hypothesis is not necessarily
undermined by the generally meager results of the existing enforcement
efforts. It may well be, as is suggested by Eckhardt's study, that the vigor
136. Id. at 14. See also Report of the Committee on One-Parent Families 1[4.163
(Cmd. 5629, 1974), a major British study recommending against imprisonment as a
sanction for nonsupport.
137. The total annual contributions of the fathers ( who had been married) to AFDC
families was estimated at $20 million, only about 10 percent of the total public assistance
funds expended on these families, despite the fact that almost one out of every 10 fathers
was either currently or had previously been imprisoned for criminal nonsupport. Kaplan,
page 856 supra, at 26, 75 ( Table A-50), 16. Estimated annual contributions by unwed
fathers amounted to about $4.6 million in 1955. Id. at 39. However, because some part
of the contribution may be used to meet family needs that cannot be met within the
maximum AFDC payment and because of costs of collection, not all of the contributions
represent a net savings in relief costs. On the other hand the enforcement efforts, if they
are really credible, may have an in terrorem effect beyond those immediately involved.
138. This assertion is based on: "l. Anecdotal material: a mass of individual cases are
known. 2. [W]elfare workers and law enforcement personnel agree that this is the case.
3. The excess of female family heads in poverty over men in poverty is much greater
than the excess of all women over all men in the population. It follows therefore that
many of the fathers of poverty families are not themselves poor. 4. The one study of the
characteristics of nonsupporting fathers shows an occupational distribution similar to that
of the entire male population - not a predominance of low-income occupations, and not
a very high proportion of unemployed . . . ." Winston & Forsher, Non-support of Legitimate Children by Affiuent Fathers as a Cause of Poverty and Welfare Dependence 15
( Rand Corp. 1971 ). See also Nagel & Weitzman, Women as Litigants, 23 Hastings L.J.
171, 187-192 (1971).
139. Winston & Forsher, note 138 supra, at 19-21.
140. Id. at viii.
141. Nagel & Weitzman, note 138 supra, at 191.
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of enforcement is presently inversely proportional to the means of the defendant, with the results destined to be frustration and failure. The Michigan
study does appear to suggest, however, that a well-designed and efficiently
functioning enforcement effort can bring impressive results. In the final
analysis, although the deplorable information gap that has so long existed
in this area is slowly beginning to be filled, there are still no conclusive
answers to the difficult questions raised in the preceding paragraphs.
3. The failure of private support remedies has led to increasing dependence upon such public programs as AFDC, 142 with all the predictable attendant complaints that welfare is breeding divorce. Although that solution
at least assures the requisite funds to the needy dependents, it does not meet
the underlying questions discussed above. Congress, with cavalier disregard
of the absence of available data concerning their ability to pay, has demanded increasingly vigorous pursuit of the support obligors. 143 Yet, as
pointed out above, the fruits of these efforts have hardly been overwhelming
to date. We thus come back to the basic unanswered question: Is there
persuasive evidence that a significant number of fathers could pay, if only
they were pursued with sufficient vigor? If so, the implications seem obvious
enough, assuming that society feels sufficiently strongly about holding men
to their family responsibilities to absorb the inevitable direct and indirect
costs of such enforcement efforts. But if these costs are deemed too great,
or if in the vast preponderance of cases the means are simply not there, then
the public support policies should be adjusted accordingly by a candid
recognition of the futility of stepped-up enforcement efforts against the
delinquent fathers. Alternative public support plans that have been proposed are a children's allowance and expansion of the Social Security concept of survivorship to include children of a deserted or divorced. father as
well as those of a deceased father. 144

As is apparent from the preceding materials, enforcement of support has,
on the whole, been woefully ineffective. Some of the possible reasons for this
142. See also the Report of the Committee on One-Parent Families 1f1f4.229 et seq.,
note 136 supra, recommending that up to the normal welfare stipend, the British Welfare
agency- should advance the funds to the mother, and then itself pursue, through the
normal civil processes, its remedies against the support obligor. The latter would be permitted to retain so much as would exceed "by a fairly generous margin" the amount he
himself would be entitled to if he were on welfare. How does this scheme differ from
AFDCP
143. For a detailed discussion of the history of the "NOLEO" provision of the AFDC
program see McKeany, The Absent Father and Public Policy in the Program of Aid to
Dependent Children ( 1959). See also Pub. Law 93-647, discussed at page 858 supra.
144. Schorr, Poor Kids (1966); Nagel & Weitzman, note 138 supra, at 191-192. See
also Part IV of the Commonwealth Social Services Act 1947-1970, an Australian statute
making the "widow's" pension available on just such an extended basis, and compare
page 846 supra concerning the proposed child support fund.
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situation ( along with the attendant policy implications) have already been
explored.As you read the ensuing pages, consider to what extent technical
deficiencies in the legal apparatus described are responsible for the prob•
lems encountered in enforcing support obligations.

